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Abstract: Recently group-oriented applications over unsecure open networks such as Internet or wireless networks
have become very popular. Thus, group communication security over unsecure open networks has become a vital
concern. Group key establishment (GKE) protocols are used to satisfy the confidentiality requirement of a newly started
communication session by the generation or sharing of an ephemeral common key between the group members. In this
study, we analyze the computation and communication eﬃciency of GKE protocols. Besides confidentiality, the security
characteristics of identification and integrity control are also required for all steps of the protocol implementations. Thus,
the main contribution of this work is to provide the computation and communication eﬃciency analysis of the same GKE
protocols along with the identification of the group entities and integrity control of messages during the protocol steps.
The specific implementation and analysis of GKE protocols are performed by group key agreement (GKA) with pairingbased cryptography and group key distribution (GKD) with verifiable secret sharing, respectively. Finally, a comparison
of GKA and GKD protocols on the basis of their strong points and cost characteristics are also provided to inform
potential users.
Key words: Group key establishment, secure communication, pairing-based cryptography, verifiable secret sharing.

1. Introduction to group key establishment protocols
The establishment of a common secret key between the members of a group over an open unsecure network is
vital to satisfy secure communication requirements. The confidentiality of the communication between members
of a group requires sharing a common ephemeral key to use in the encryption and decryption of communication
data. For this purpose, there are two group key establishment (GKE) protocols: group key agreement (GKA),
a protocol whereby the parties jointly establish a common secret, and group key distribution (GKD), a protocol
whereby one of the parties creates or obtains a secret value and then securely distributes it to other parties.
The first security drawback of both methods is the lack of authentication. For this reason, an active
adversary can compromise the communication of legitimate parties by the use of a “man in the middle attack”.
The second security drawback is the lack of confidentiality and integrity checking during the protocol execution.
Authentication is generally based on long-term keys, which can be associated with identities. There are
two main approaches to provide authentication: public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity based (ID-based)
infrastructure. However, ID-based cryptography has two important disadvantages. First, it suﬀers from the key
escrow problem since the private key generator generates private keys of entities using its master secret key.
Second, it requires a secure channel to distribute generated private keys to participants. In this study:
∗ Correspondence:
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(i) The GKA original protocol model is based on Lin et al.’s multiparty key agreement protocol [1]. Our
contribution is the usage of a digital signature in order to provide message integrity checking and authentication between the users with a PKI solution.
(ii) The GKD original protocol model is based on Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing (VSS) key distribution
protocol [2,3]. Due to nature of the VSS protocol, there is a secure channel requirement. We propose
the usage of PKI, encryption, and signature schemes, which are realized in the execution of protocol over
unsecure public networks.
In this article, we analyze and compare the communication and computation costs of these two GKE
protocol models with and without our contribution (i.e. authentication and integrity checking).
Section 2 presents the notations and specifications of the implemented protocols. In Section 3, the
construction of GKA and GKD protocols is examined with their implementation results and security and
eﬃciency analyses with and without our contributions. Finally, Section 4 presents the results of the eﬃciency
analysis and implementation of the GKE protocols.
2. Notations, assumptions, and specifications of implemented protocol models
2.1. Notations used in the implementation of protocol models
The common notations of both protocol implementations are:
• n is the number of participants in the group.
• Ui is a participant of group, Ui ∈ {U1 , U2 , . . . , Un , i = 1, .., n .
• Certi = {IDi, Yi is the certificate of Ui and its long-term public key is Yi , and the unique numeric
identifier is IDi, . Certi is signed by the certification authority (CA).
• H is an SHA-512 secure hash function.
The specific notations of key agreement protocol are:
• A bilinear map e : Gp × Gp → GT between the two groups Gp and GT as long as a variant of the
computational Diﬃe–Hellman assumption is hard on Gp .
• p is the prime number.
• P is the generator of additive group Gp .
• K is the common secret key.
• ai is the long-term private key randomly chosen by Ui .
• Yi is the long-term public key computed Yi = ai P by the related party Ui .
• xi is the short-term (ephemeral) secret key randomly chosen by Ui .
• Ti and Xi are public messages.
• Public parameters are param = ⟨Gp , GT , e, p, P, H⟩.
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ŞAHİN and ASLANOĞLU/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

The specific notations of key distribution protocol are:
• Primes q and psuch that q | (p − 1), and a generator g ∈ Zp∗ is an element of order q .
• s is common secret that will be shared.
• si ∈ { s1 , s2 , . . ., sn } represent subsecrets.
• L is a leader who shares the common secret s among the n participants.
• xi is Ui ’s long-term secret key of corresponding public key Yi .
• t is the threshold value, according to Shamir’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme.
• f (x) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 + . . . + at xt − 1 , is a (t − 1) degree polynomial in which secret s = a0 and
[ a0 , . . . , at ] ∈ Zq .
• C is the commitment vector including diﬀerent t DLog commitments;
Ci = g ai , i = 0, .., t .
• ( sig 1 sig 2 ) is signature pair and

(

Enc1i , Enc2i

)

is an ElGamal encryption pair.

• Public parameters are param = ⟨q, p, g, H⟩.
2.2. Assumptions used in the implementation of protocols
• Before the protocol starts, every party Ui generates his/her Certi = { IDi, Yi } from a CA and these
certificates of users have already been exchanged between group participants.
• The protocol works over an open unsecure channel forming a secure, closed communication group of
participants. The members of the group are called reliable; they do not leak secret information outside of
the group, and they send the correct messages defined by the protocol. All participants agree to follow
the protocol.
2.3. Specifications of the implemented protocols
For key agreement protocol:
• The protocol models use the broadcast communication model.
• For each run of the protocol, there is one among n parties, which works as a leader L and starts the
protocol specifying the static group number.
For key distribution protocol:
• The protocol needs two constant rounds, namely sharing and reconstruction, with n parties who participate in the establishment of the common secret and a leader L who shares the common secret s and
commitments C among the n participants.
• There is a threshold value, which means that more than t shared subsecret values can be used to
reconstruct the common secret generated by the leader. The relation between the threshold t and n
is ≥ ( 2t + 1 ) [4,5].
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3. Implementation of GKA and GKD protocols
A more detailed documentation and numeric examples of these implementations were presented in [6].

3.1. The common implementation environment
Both algorithms are implemented for a small group of users as Ui , i = 1, .., 4 . ANSI C is preferred as the
programming language and the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) Library (http://gmplib.org/) is
chosen
for
multiple
precision
calculations,
while
the
OpenSSL
Library
(http://www.openssl.org/) is used for SHA-512 (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips). The Pairing-Based
Cryptography (PBC) Library (http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/) is used for the pairing map and elliptic curve
calculations are used for the key agreement protocol. The configuration of the machine is an Intel Core 2 Duo
2.0 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM, and Ubuntu 12.10 operating system.

3.2. Security contributions to the GKA protocol
In this study, the communication among reliable participants satisfies the confidentiality via pairing-based
cryptography and identification, integrity, and nonrepudiation via the Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) short
signature scheme [7,8].

3.3. Security contributions to the GKD protocol
The protocol is transformed into a feasible form to apply over an open-unsecure channel by adding encryption
and signature algorithms. In this study, the communication between reliable participants satisfies the confidentiality via cryptographic structures such as the ElGamal encryption algorithm and satisfies the identification,
integrity, and nonrepudiation via the ElGamal signature scheme [9]. To improve the security level of the implementation, ElGamal encryption and signature schemes can be implemented by diﬀerent group structures or
schemes as indicated in [10,11].

3.4. Implementation and eﬃciency analysis of GKA protocol
Setup: This is an oﬄine task and numeric values of input and setup parameters are calculated by use of the
PBC Library. E is a super singular curve defined by y 2 = x3 +x over Fq and P ∈ E/Fq is a 1024-bit generator.
The Weil pairing on the curve E / Fq2 is a mapping: Gq × Gq → GT . The q = p • h + 1 is 512-bit prime
number where h is a multiple of 12 and p is 160-bit prime number. Each Ui should have static public Yi as a
1024-bit and private ai as a 160-bit key pair where Yi =ai P .
Now the protocol can be started by leader L . Here the process of the protocol is given in two sections
as “GKA - protocol steps” and “GKA - protocol steps with contributions” as depicted in Figures 1 and 2,
respectively.

3.4.1. GKA protocol steps as depicted in Figure 1
The leader L from set U announces the public parameters param = ⟨ Gp , GT , e, p, P, H⟩ and the group
number n . Then the first round starts.
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Figure 1. GKA - protocol steps.
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Figure 2. GKA - protocol steps with contributions.

Round 1 - Step 1: Each user Ui , i = 1, . . ., n , chooses a random ephemeral secret number xi ,
computes Ti = xi Yi = xi (ai P ), and sends Ti to all users.
Round 2 - Step 2: Each user does pairing operation to generate and broadcast the message
Xi =e ((Yi+1 +Ti+1 ) , (Yi+2 + T i+2 ) − (Yi−1 + T i−1 ))

(ai + ai xi )

.

Round 2 - Step 3: Each user calculates the common key:
Ki =e ((Yi+1 + Ti+1 ) , n × (Yi−1 + Ti−1 ))
[
e (P, P )

ai + ai xi

× Xin−1 ×X n−2
i+1 × . . . × X i−2 =

(an + an xn ) × (a1 + a1 x1 ) × (a2 + a2 x2 ) + (a1 + a1 x1 ) × (a2 + a2 x2 ) × (a3 + a3 x3 ) + . . .
+ (an−1 + an−1 xn−1 ) × (an + an xn ) × (an+1 + an+1 xn+1 )

]
.

Furthermore, the common shared secret key is then obtained by the key derivation function algorithm-kdf ,
which is simultaneously used to calculate the common secret by each Ui (http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsalabs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-5-password-based-cryptography-standard.html).
K = kdf ( K i ∥ U1 ∥ U2 ∥ U3 ∥ U4 ) .
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3.4.2. GKA protocol steps with contributions as depicted in Figure 2
Round 1 - Step 1: Each user calculates and signs Ti and sends Sig i (Ti ) to all users for identification and
integrity checking, and at the same time verifies all received Sig i (Ti ) . In implementation, each user generates
a digest value of Ti by Hi = SHA − 512(T i ) . Then Ui signs the Hi value with his static private key ai by
using the BLS short signature scheme. Here the BLS output is a point on E / Fq with 1024-bit length.
Each user Ui also verifies received Sig i (Ti ) by calculating Hi and checking that e(Sig i (Ti ), P ) =
e(Hi Yi ). If the result of the function is equal, then Sig i (Ti ) is verified.
Round 2 - Step 2: Each user does pairing operation to generate, sign, and broadcast the message
Sig i (Xi ) and verify all received Sig i (Xi ) by these calculations: Hi = SHA 512(X i ) and Sig i (Xi ) = ai Hi .
The verification of the received Ui ’s signatures and integrity checking of Xi are satisfied by calculation
of Hi = SHA − 512(X i ) and checking the equality of e (Sig i (Xi ) , P ) = e(Hi Yi ) .
Round 2 - Step 3: Each user simultaneously calculates the common key K as described in Step 3 of
Section 3.4.1. This step does not require any security contribution.
3.4.3. Observations and eﬃciency analysis of GKA
In light of both implementation results of the protocol, the total eﬃciency costs in terms of computation,
communication, and round complexities including the whole parties during Round 1 and Round 2 are available
in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Table 1. Implementation results of GKA-based steps.

GKA - protocol steps
Round 1 - Step 1
Round 2 - Step 2
Round 2 - Step 3
Total cost of protocol

Computational cost (ms)
4
Θ( 1 )
3
Θ( 1 )
6
Θ( 1 )
13 Θ( 1 )

Communication cost (bits)
n × 1024
n × 1024
n × 2048 → Θ( n )

Table 2. Implementation results of GKA protocol with contributions.

GKA - protocol steps
with contributions
Round 1 - Step 1
Round 2 - Step 2
Round 2 - Step 3
Total cost of protocol

Computational cost (ms)

Communication cost (bits)

28
13 + 5(n − 1)
6
(42 + 5n)

n × 2048
n × 2048
–
n× 4096 → Θ( n )

Θ( 1 )
Θ( n )
Θ( 1 )
Θ( n )

• As seen from these results (Tables 1 and 2), only the computational cost is aﬀected by security contributions
and its computational complexity increases from a constant to a linear class. On the other hand, the
communication cost grows twice but it already belongs to the same linear complexity class due to the
used signature scheme. Diﬀerent signature schemes can add diﬀerent space costs.
3.5. Implementation and eﬃciency analysis of GKD protocol - VSS
Setup: This is an oﬄine task of the protocol. The numeric values of input and setup parameters are calculated
by using the GMP Library. The p is a 1024-bit prime number and g is a 1024-bit primitive root of Zp∗ . The q
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is a 512-bit prime number, where q | (p − 1). For each user Ui and leader we have a (1024-bit) static private key
xi ∈Zp∗ , and (1024-bit) static public key Yi where Yi = g xi (mod p) and Certi = ( Yi , IDi ) , which is exchanged
before the protocol starts.
Now the protocol can be started by one of the group participants, called leader L. Here the process of
the protocol is presented in two sections as “GKD - protocol steps” (Figure 3) and “GKD - protocol steps with
contributions” (Figure 4).

Leader

−

, and
#1 The Leader generates
then sends and to each
veriﬁes received with
#2 Each
received and send own veriﬁed to
all other users except Leader.
#3 Veriﬁca!on of subsecrets that
are received from other users is done by
using .
#4 Each calculates common key by
Lagrange Interpola!on

Figure 3. GKD - protocol steps.
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on of and then veriﬁca on of
. Then
sends own veriﬁed
to all other users .
#3 Each
received

decrypts received
with .

then
them to
of ,
with
and

values and veriﬁes

#4 Each
calculates common key
Lagrange Interpola on.

byy

−

Figure 4. GKD - protocol steps with contributions.

3.5.1. GKD protocol steps as presented in Figure 3
Round 1 - Sharing phase
Leader L announces the public parameters ⟨⟩param = q, p, g, H and the group number n. Here
n = 4 and t = ⌈ (n − 1) / 2 ⌉ = 2, which defines the second-degree polynomial f (x) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 (mod q) .
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In this polynomial, a0 , a1 , a2 ∈ Zq are randomly selected constants of polynomial, and a0 would like to be
shared among the four participants as common secret key s. The commitment vector C is based on DLog
commitments [4] as C = ( C 0 = g a0 , C1 = g a1 , C 2 = g a2 ) (mod p).
Step 1: L generates f (x), C , and su-secrets si for each user Ui , using IDi ; si = f (IDi ) (mod q). The
leader sends C and si to each Ui .
Round 2 - Reconstruction phase
Step 2: Each Ui does verification of subsecret si by using received commitment vector C . If si is
verified properly, it is sent to all other (n − 2) users by Ui .
Step 3: The verification of subsecrets si that are received from the other (n − 2) users is done by using
C. This step has to be done by (n − 1) users for (n − 2) times, and hence the computational complexity is O(n2 )
in this step of the protocol.
g si (mod p) =

t
∏
j=0

j

Cji (mod p) where i, ( i = 1, . ., n ) are indices of the participant and j, ( j = 0, . . ., t )

are indices of polynomial coeﬃcients.
Step 4: Lagrange interpolation and common secret key establishment.
Each party Ui has to construct polynomial f (x) from any ( t + 1 ) verified subsecrets si , which are
collected in set Wi and then used in the following Lagrange interpolation formula:
Li (0) = λw
i =
f (0) =

t∑
+1
Ui ∈ W

t∏
+1
U i , U j ∈ W, j ̸= i

ID j
ID j − ID i

and then:

Li (0)si (note that s = a0 = f (0)) gives the common secret key.

This step is realized (n − 1) (t + 1) times, and then the complexity is here (n2 ). The lower bound also
( )
is equal to Ω(n2 ) due to t = ⌈ (n − 1) / 2 ⌉, so the complexity value θ n2 is used in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3. Implementation results of GKD-based steps.

GKD - protocol steps
Round 1 - Step 1
Round 2-Steps 2
Round 2 - Step 3
Round 2-Step 4
Total cost of protocol

Computational cost (ms)
6
Θ( 1 )
1
Θ( 1 )
2
Θ( n2 )
0.04 Θ( n2 )
9
Θ( n2 )

Communication cost (bits)
n × 1024 + 512
n2 × 512
Θ( n2 )

Table 4. Implementation results of GKD protocol with contributions.

GKD - protocol steps
with contributions
Round 1 - Step 1
Round 2-Steps 2
Round 2 - Step 3
Round 2-Step 4
Total cost of protocol

Computational cost (ms)

Communication cost (bits)

18
14
6
0.04
38

(n × 512) + (t × 1024)
n2 × 512
n2 × 2048
Θ( n2 )

Θ( 1 )
Θ( 1 )
Θ( n2 )
Θ( n2 )
Θ( n2 )
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3.5.2. GKD protocol steps with contributions as depicted in Figure 4
Step 1: The L generates f (x) and C and si as aforementioned in Section 3.5.1, Step 1. Before sending C
and si , L uses the ElGamal signature algorithm in order to sign the commitment vector.
HCommit = SHA − 512( C0 ∥ C 1 ∥ C 2 )
sig 1 = g r (mod p) where random r is gcd (r , p − 1) = 1
sig 2 = (HCommit − xL sig 1 ) r−1 mod (p − 1)
L encrypts the calculated si by using the receiver’s public key Yi separately via the ElGamal encryption
algorithm.
Enc1Leader = g

rLeader

(mod p) where random rLeader is ∈ { 1, 2, .., p − 1 }
rLeader

Enc2Leader = si (Yi )

mod p

At the end of the Round 1, L sends each encrypted si to each related Ui via an open unsecure channel,
accompanied with signature pair (sig 1 , sig 2 )C of the commitment vector.
Round 2 - Reconstruction phase
Step 2: Each Ui verifies the leader’s signature, using the leader’s public key YL .
HCommit = SHA 512 ( C0 ∥ C 1 ∥ C 2 ) and g Hcommit = (YL )

sig 1

sig 2

sig 1

mod p

If this equality is satisfied, the receiver Ui is sure about the integrity of the C vector and legitimacy of
(
)
L . Then each Ui decrypts incoming subsecret Enc1Leader , Enc2Leader , using his own private key xi .
xi −1

si = Enc2Leader • ((Enc1Leader ) )

mod p

Each Ui uses the receiver’s public key Yj to encrypt his own si via the ElGamal encryption algorithm and sends
it to the other users of the group to satisfy secrecy and robustness against attacks.
r

Enc1user = g mod p where random r ϵ Zp∗ ,
r

Enc2user = si (Yj ) mod p where si is subsecret of Ui
(
)
Step 3: Each Ui decrypts the received encrypted subsecrets Enc1user , Enc2user from other users; si =
xj −1

Enc2user ((Enc1user ) )

mod p . Then these decrypted si values are verified by using C ; g si mod p =

t
∏
j=0

Cji

j

mod p where i = 1, . ., n are the indices of participants and j = 0, . . ., t are the indices of polynomial
coeﬃcients.
Step 4: Each party Ui has to construct polynomial f (x) from any ( t + 1 ) verified subsecrets si . Then
the common secret key is established by using the Lagrange interpolation formula as explained in Step 4 of
Section 3.5.1. Here, this step does not require additional security contribution.
3.5.3. Observations and eﬃciency analysis of GKD
Our results regarding the protocol implementations are available in Tables 3 and 4.
• The computational overhead is a quadratic value with or without security contributions.
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• Most of the computation costs of the protocol steps depend on not only the user number but also on the
threshold value t . When user number increases, the size of t will increase and the computation overhead
will become very costly. The counts of execution of encryption and decryption algorithms are n2 .
• The proposed protocol is not proper for group key establishment protocol due to very costly communication
overhead.
• Finally, round complexity is stable with only two rounds independent of user number.
• The protocol information is theoretically secure even when the adversary has unlimited computing power.
Thus, the adversary simply does not have enough information to break the encryption unless he has
( t + 1 ) values [12,13].
4. Conclusion
Eﬃciency is quantified in terms of computation, communication, and round complexity. The experiments in the
presented study are performed by using pairing-based cryptography with and without BLS signature scheme for
GKA and VSS with and without ElGamal encryption and signature for GKD. The related eﬃciency analysis and
their comparisons are summarized in Table 5, and the following findings can be useful to choose and evaluate
a group key establishment solution:
Table 5. Comparison of measured implementation results of protocol models.

Protocol models
GKA
GKD

Without contributions - Costs
Computation Communication
Θ( 1 )
Θ( n )
Θ( n2 )
Θ( n2 )

With contributions - Costs
Computation Communication
Θ( n )
Θ( n )
Θ( n2 )
Θ (n2 )

1. The proposed contribution of signature algorithms, usage of certification mechanisms to identify the group
members, and encryption improves the reliability and robustness of the protocol and gives a chance to use
it with open unsecure networks. Hence, the protocol has some prevention of passive and active adversaries
with negligible overheads.
2. As depicted in Table 5, computational complexity is linear for GKA and quadratic for GKD, which depends
on the number of users in the group. The entity count, communication channel limits, and new participant
addition or removal scenarios are the critical parameters to decide on the most suitable protocol model of
GKE.
(a) The GKA protocol: The key issues for this model can be stated as follows:
• If any party establishes the wrong secret, he/she will be aware of the failure only when one of the
participants encrypts messages with a wrong secret key and the recipient cannot decrypt it. In that
case, the recipient sends an error message and the protocol restarts by picking a new ephemeral
secret.
• Static participant number is an important drawback of the protocol. If a new participant would like
to join a group, the protocol has to restart to regenerate a new common key. This can be accepted
as an advantage or disadvantage according to protocol expectations, because the new user never
knows the old secret key.
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(b) The GKD protocol: The key issues for this model can be stated as follows:
• Consistency of the received messages can be verified via commitments; correctness is guaranteed
this way and wrong secret sharing is impossible until the protocol is completed.
• If new party addition or removal occurs simultaneously in the same amount to/from the group during
any round of the protocol, there is no any change in the subsecrets of old parties and the common
secret s remains the same. However, if the number of entity additions and removals is not balanced,
the subsecrets of old parties and the common secret s will change since the protocol starts with new
(t, n) parameters.
3. In GKA, the communicating participants have equal contributions, but in GKD the leader is diﬀerent
from others.
4. Certainly, there is a requirement to solve user count limits in groups for GKE protocols because every
entity in an open unsecure network should be identified to securely communicate with each other as a
closed group.
5. Furthermore, as a future study a formal security analysis of the protocol models with the proposed
contributions is necessary to truly verify the approach.
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